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Abstract: 
The  relationship  between  the  structural   identity  of  narrative  and  the  truth  claim  of  the  historical  narrative  
work   is   one   of   importance   to   Ricœur.   He   considers   the   attempts   of   two   interwoven   models   of   history  
emerging  from  analytic  philosophy—explanatory  and  narrative—to  articulate  this  relationship.  This  paper  
explores   the   trajectories  of   these  models  as  well   as   the  epistemological   and  ontological   crises   culminating  
from   the   “simple”   theses   of   each  model.  The   solution   to   these   crises   requires   a  more   complex  method   to  
account   for   the  nature  of   the  connections  underlying  historical  understanding.  Georg  Henrik  von  Wright’s  
provisional  or  “hybrid”  model  of  explanation  and  understanding  revises  the  simple  explanatory  model  and  
is  foundational  for  Ricœur’s  own  complex  revision  of  narrativist  models  through  his  notion  of  questioning  
back.  The  present  paper  argues  that  the  structure  of  this  hybrid  model  was  unsatisfactory  for  von  Wright,  
and  leads  in  the  direction  of  Ricœur’s  own  narrative  method.  
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Résumé: 
La  relation  entre  l’identité  structurale  du  récit  et  la  prétention  à  la  vérité  de  l’œuvre  de  récit  historique  est  
fondamentale  chez  Ricœur.  Il  considère  que  les  deux  modèles  historiographiques  de  provenance  analytique  
–   le  modèle   explicatif   et   le  modèle  narratif   –  peuvent   s’articuler.  Cet   article   explore   les   trajectoires  de   ces  
modèles  autant  que  les  crises  épistémologiques  et  ontologiques  qui  culminent  dans  chacune  des  thèses  prise  
dans  un  sens  unilatéral.  La  solution  pour  remédier  à  ces  crises   requiert  une  méthode  plus  complexe  pour  
tenir  compte  de  la  nature  des  liens  qui  sous-­‐‑tendent  la  compréhension  historique.  Le  modèle  d’explication  et  
de   compréhension,   provisoire   et   “hybride,”   de   Georg   Henrik   von   Wright   permet   de   réviser   le   simple  
modèle   explicatif.   Ceci   est   fondamental   pour   comprendre     la   révision   complexe   que   Ricœur   apporte   aux  
modèles   narrativistes   à   travers   la   reprise   de   la   notion   de   “questionnement   à   rebours.”   La   présente  
contribution   fait   valoir   que   la   structure  de   ce  modèle   hybride   n’est   pas   satisfaisante   pour   von  Wright,   et  
débouche  dans  le  sens  de  la  méthode  narrative  proposée  par  Ricœur.  
Mots-­‐‑clés:  Ricœur,  von  Wright,  Narrative,  Histoire,  Questionnenement  à  rebours.  
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In  his  preface  to  Time  and  Narrative,  I,  Paul  Ricœur  writes:  
[A]t  stake  in  the  case  of  the  structural  identity  of  the  narrative  function  as  well  as  in  that  of  
the  truth  claim  of  every  narrative  work,  is  the  temporal  character  of  human  experience.  .  .  
[T]ime   becomes   human   time   to   the   extent   that   it   is   organized   after   the   manner   of   a  
narrative;   narrative,   in   turn,   is  meaningful   to   the   extent   that   it   portrays   the   features   of  
temporal  experience.1  
Outside  of  hermeneutic   theory,   this  status  of   the   truth  value  of  narrative  models  of  history  has  
been  debated  from  its  first  introduction  in  the  mid-­‐‑twentieth  century,  and  attempts  to  articulate  
narrative   models   have   been   tightly   interwoven   with   attempts   to   provide   explanatory   models  
within   analytic   philosophy.   Ricœur   examines   the   pathways   of   both   explanatory   and   narrative  
models   of   history   and   the   epistemological   and   ontological   crises   emerging   from   each.   He  
suggests  a  point  of  contact  between  the  two  trajectories  in  the  work  of  Georg  Henrik  von  Wright,  
an   analytic   philosopher   who   shared   Ricœur’s   understanding   of   the   interrelationship   between  
causal   and   teleological   dimensions   of   historical   explanation.   I   trace   some   of   the   interwoven  
origins   of   these   explanatory   and   narrative   models   of   history   within   analytic   philosophy,   the  
philosophical   crises   that   emerge,   and   the   convergence   with   Ricoeur’s   complex   or   hybrid  
narrative   theory.   Ultimately   von   Wright   later   found   his   own   provisional   hybrid   solution  
unsatisfactory,  and  he  revised  his  thesis  to  one  of  “understanding  explanation.”  I  will  argue  that  
the   notion   of   understanding   on   which   von   Wright’s   revised   thesis   rests   depends   upon   a  
definition  of  intelligibility  in  terms  of  narrative  which  has  not  been  examined  in  his  work.  While  
pointing  to  a  convergence  between  hermeneutic  and  analytic  philosophy,  his  thesis  also  reveals  
several  potential  weaknesses  in  Ricoeur’s  own  complex  narrative  theory.  
One  of  Ricœur’s  working  hypotheses  is  that  historiography  does  genuinely  belong  in  the  
field   of   narrative   fiction.   In   contrast   to,   but   in   many   ways   building   on,   the   methodological  
approach   to   history   offered   by   the  Annales   school   as  well   as   the   epistemological   approach   of  
analytic  philosophy,  Ricœur  insists  on  the  necessity  of  narrative  in  historiography.  He  writes  that  
if  history  “were   to  break  every  connection  to  our  basic  competence   for   following  a  story  and  to   the  
cognitive  operations  constitutive  of  our  narrative  understanding.   .   .   it  would   lose   its  distinctive  
place   in   the   chorus   of   social   sciences.”2   This   claim   itself—especially   its   notions   of   following   a  
story  and  narrative  understanding—depends  heavily  on  concepts  derived  from  his  engagement  
with   analytic   philosophy,   especially   the   theories   of   Dray,   Gallie,   and   von   Wright,   whose  
contributions  to  Ricœur’s  narrative  theory  I  will  sketch  below.  After  providing  an  overview  of  the  
successive   stages   of   these   explanatory   and   narrative  models,   I  will   outline   the   epistemological  
and  ontological  crises  in  historiography  arising  from  these  trajectories.  I  will  argue  that  Ricœur’s  
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solution  of  questioning  back,  while  borrowed  from  Husserl,  is  closely  aligned  with  von  Wright’s  
attempt  to  distinguish  between  explanation  and  understanding  in  history.  
“Simple”  Explanatory  and  Narrative  Models  of  History  
In  his  1942  essay,  “The  Function  of  the  General  Laws  in  History,”  C.  G.  Hempel  applied  
the  “covering-­‐‑law  model”  of   scientific  explanation   to  historiography,  arguing   that  general   laws  
were  necessary  to  prevent  “empirically  meaningless  terms”  from  corrupting  the  scientific  validity  
of  historical  science.3  This  nomological  approach  came,  of  course,  at   the  cost  of   the  explanatory  
value  of  history.  In  sharp  contrast  to  Hempel’s  scientific  approach  to  historiography,  W.  H.  Dray  
argued  in  1957  that  for  a  law  to  have  explanatory  value  in  the  field  of  history,  such  a  law  would  
have   to  become  so   specific   that   there  would  be   the  equivalent  of  “‘law’   for  a   single   case.”4  For  
Dray,   historical   events   were   seen   as   unique   and   laws   inappropriate;   historiography   instead  
depended   upon   the   intentionality   of   the   historiographer   who   must   gather   dispersed   and  
dissimilar   events   and   judge   them  rationally   according   to   their   inductive  and  pragmatic  merits.  
He  was   effectively   substituting   a   rational   explanation   of   events   for   a   nomological   one.  Ricœur  
concluded  that  Dray’s  rejection  of  the  covering  law  model  seemed  to  return  to  a  conception  of  the  
event   as  unique,   but   the  greater   limitation  of   this   rational   approach,   according   to  Ricœur,  was  
that  it  did  not  account  for  historical  events  not  explainable  at  level  of  the  individual  agent.  A  gulf  
remained  between  the  individual’s  reasons  and  historical  explanation  in  terms  of  the  social  forces  
influencing  those  reason.5  
French   Annalists   had   offered   an   alternative   methodology   based   on   probability   and  
statistics   that  was  at  once   social-­‐‑scaled  and  a   rejection  of  both   the   covering   law  model  and   the  
subjectivism   of   rational   explanation.6   But   Ricœur   objected   to   the   Annalists’   elimination   of   the  
individual   event   altogether   (by   calling   for   a   “nonevent   history”).7   His   emphasis   was   on   the  
locations   where   narrative   status   of   history   was   at   stake;   namely,   analytic   explanatory   and  
narrative  models  of  history.  
In  the  1960’s  Anglo-­‐‑American  philosophers  offered  another  alternative  to  Hempel’s  and  
Dray’s  conceptions  of  history:  that  narrative  was  a  logic  for  contextualizing  history.  W.  B.  Gallie  
argued  in  his  1968  Philosophy  and  the  Historical  Understanding  that  explanation  and  understanding  
of   history   “must   be   assessed   in   relation   to   the   narrative   forms   which   arise   and   whose  
development   they   subserve.”8   Unlike   scientific   laws,   narrative   forms   do   not   eliminate  
contingencies   and   do   not   permit   prediction;   instead,   he   contends,   they   allow   a   kind   of  
understanding  that  permits  one  to  follow  unexpected  circumstances.  The  followability  of  a  story,  
Ricœur  believes,  indicates  that  a  story  is  explained  (directed  causally)  while,  at  the  same  time,  the  
outcome   is   (teleologically)  understood.  Hence   “understanding  and  explanation  are   inextricably  
mixed  together  in  this  process.”9  
Arthur  Danto  proposed  another  teleological  approach  in  arguing  that  narrative  occurs  at  
the   level   of   the   sentence   but   can’t   be   known   until   after   all   sentences   have   been   collected   and  
connected  by  the  historian  “as  parts  of  a  temporal  whole.”10  Narrative  therefore  “mentions  only  
the  significant  events”11  with  an  eye  toward  this   teleological  explanation  of  history.  But  Ricœur  
found   that  Danto’s  sentence-­‐‑level  analysis   left   significant  gaps   in  attempting   to   tie   together   the  
events:  Gallie’s  notion   that  narrative   exists   at   the   level   of   the   text   (rather   than   the   sentence)   as  
what   is   “followable,”   he   believed,   surpassed   Danto’s   theory   that   narrative   sentences   mention  
only  the  events  which  are  significant.  For,  Ricœur  asks,  “is  not  the  narrative  organization  which  
Linda  L.  Cox  
  
  
Études  Ricœuriennes  /  Ricœur  Studies          





confers  on  events  a  meaning  or  an   importance   (the   two  connotations  of   the   term   ‘significance’)  
simply  an  expansion  of  the  narrative  sentence?”12  First,  Ricœur  is  pointing  out  that  events  are  not  
necessarily   significant   prior   to   their   narrative   organization,   since   the   process   of   narrative  
organization   is   itself  what   confers   significance  on   them.  And   secondly,   he   is   implying   that   the  
creation  of  meaning  is  the  goal  of  narrative,  not  only  its  method  
But   if   narrative   confers   significance   on   events,   then   what   justifies   this   signification?  
Could  a  fictive  “historical”  narrative,  then,  create  historical  meaning  or  importance?  We  can  now  
hear   the   rumblings  of  an  ontological   crisis   emerging   in   the   trajectory  of   the  narrative  model  of  
history.   Louis  O.  Mink   argued   that   historical   understanding,   while   not   using   prediction,  
falsifiabibility,   or   other   scientific   methodological   tools,   served   as   its   own   support   for  
explanation.13  He   attempted   to   reassert   the   essential   distinction   between   fiction   and  history   by  
agreeing  that  both  are  narratives  of  events  or  actions,  but  also  stating  that  fiction  makes  no  claim  
to  truth.14  
The   belief   that   narrative   is   supplementary   to   text—that   an   historical   context   is  
ontologically  prior  to  its  narrative  embodiment  and  that  we  have  access  to  that  authentic  reality  
through   research—found   its   strongest   opponent   in  Hayden  White,   who   argued   in  Metahistory  
that  history  is  a  “verbal  structure  in  the  form  of  a  narrative  prose  discourse  that  purports  to  be  a  
model,   or   icon,   of   past   structures   and   processes   in   the   interest   of   explaining   what   they   were   by  
representing  them.”15  His  arguments  are  based  on  the  idea  that  “tropes  by  which  historians  write  
history,   including   formal   argument,   organicist,   mechanistic,   etc.,   and   their   ideological  
explanations,   including   conservative,   liberal,   anarchist,   radical,   etc.,   are   all   techniques   which  
precede  the  data  they  describe.”16  White  develops  his  argument  in  Tropics  of  Discourse,  claiming  
that   all   discourse  must   be   analyzed   on   three   levels—the   description   of   the   data   (mimesis),   the  
argument  or  narrative  (diegesis),  and  the  combination  of  the  two,  which  includes  the  level  of  self-­‐‑
reflective   and   ironic   comprehension.17   Because   historical   science,   unlike   the   natural   sciences,  
occupies   the   realm  of  discourse,   it   can  only  be   framed   in   the   tropes  of  discourse,   and   so   lends  
itself  to  a  type  of  understanding  vastly  different  from  scientific  understanding.  He  writes,  
The  historically  real,  the  past  real,  is  that  to  which  I  can  be  referred  only  by  an  artifact  that  
is   textual   in   nature.   The   indexical,   iconic   and   symbolic   notations   of   language,   and  
therefore   of   texts.   .   .   create   the   illusion   that   there   is   a   past   out   there   that   is   directly  
reflected  in  texts.18  
By  drawing  our  attention  to  the  “meta”  of  history,  the  reflection  of  things  rather  than  the  things  
reflected,  White   believes   such   a   semiological   approach   to   intellectual   history   “fixes   us   directly  
before  the  process  of  meaning  production  that  is  the  special  subject  of  intellectual  history.”19  But,  
like  other  types  of  structuralism,  White  attempts  to  consider  his  own  analysis  outside  historical  
time.  Paul  Connerty  notes  that  White’s  argument  prioritizes  his  own  type  of  history,  intellectual  
history,  which  employs  self-­‐‑reflexive  critique:  “Rhetoric  itself  does  not  exist  ‘outside’  history,  and  
therefore   a   tropological   model   cannot   be   made   the   basis   of   a   wholly   immanent   analysis.”20  
Ricœur  writes  that  the  historian’s  structures  are  not  “inert  rules”  but  are  instead  “the  forms  of  a  
cultural  heritage.”21  
Hence,   in   the   absence   of   a   viable   rhetorical   structure   in   which   to   construct   narrative,  
historical   text   thus   appears   to   have   lost   all   connection   to   an   extralinguistic   context.   Analytic  
philosophy   had   introduced   narrative   theory   into   historiography   in   an   attempt   to   resolve   the  
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dilemma  between  covering  laws  over  against  disparate,  unique  events,  but,  in  the  process,  a  new  
crisis  of  authenticity  emerged.  Connerty  states  the  problem  as  such:  
Thus,   in   historiography   we   are   faced   with   a   dilemma:   any   analysis   that   emphasizes  
context  and  characterizes  its  narrative  representation  as  supplementary  only  invokes  the  
narrative   text   that   blocks   the  way   to   the   context;   this   is  White’s   criticism   of   traditional  
historiography.  But  conversely,  any  analysis  that  foregrounds  narrative  without  reference  
to   context,   or   negates   or   erases   that   context,   as  White’s   semiological   history   does,   only  
invokes   the   context   that   it   argued   could   not   be   reached   [since   rhetorical   structures   are  
always  historical].22  
The  simple  narrative  thesis,  Ricœur  writes,  thus  brought  historiography  to  the  “brink  of  a  major  
difficulty,”  and  its  self-­‐‑defeating  nature  had  no  chance  of  replacing  the  explanatory  model.23  
Ricœur’s  “Complex”  Narrative  Thesis  and  Questioning  Back  
Ricœur   has   thus   been   preparing   us   for   his   own   complex   narrative   thesis,   which   he  
compares  to  a  similar  trajectory  occurring  from  the  other  direction,  an  analysis  of  the  explanatory  
model  of  history  that  Henric  von  Wright  had  been  pursuing.  
Von   Wright’s   work   on   explanation   and   understanding   in   history   intersects   with  
Ricoeur’s   work   on   the   circular   nature   of   time   and   narrative   precisely   at   this   point.   Ricœur’s  
(confoundingly)   “complex”   thesis   concerning   narrative   introduces   a   method   of   “questioning  
back”  borrowed  from  Husserl  but  influenced  by  von  Wright’s  theory.  I  will  provide  an  overview  
of  Ricœur’s  method,  and  then  look  closely  at  its  points  of  contact  with  von  Wright’s  explanatory  
model.  
In  Time  and  Narrative,  I,  Ricœur  discusses  three  temporal  elements  involved  in  narrative:  
prefiguration  (the  pretextual  reality,  or  mimesis1),  configuration  (the  emplotting  of  the  pretextual  
reality   by   giving   it   a   narrative   structure,   or   mimesis2),   and   refiguration   (the   reception   of   the  
emplotted  reality  by  the  reader,  or  mimesis3).  When  a  reader  encounters  a  text  through  mimesis3  
(and   this   is   always   the   initial   encounter),   he   or   she   finds   that   pretextual   reality   is   already  
configured  into  “plot.”  For  Ricœur  (following  Husserl),  meanings  accumulate  and  settle,  as  this  
written  plot  is  read  or  heard,  its  reception  adds  a  dynamic  dimension  which  surpasses  authorial  
intention.24   The   act   of   reading   shakes   up   the   sedimented   layers   of   narrative   that   have  
accumulated   through   the   years—including   the   paradigmatic   layers   of   forms   and   genres—
transforming   them   through   innovation.   Thus,   in   this   sense,   questioning   back   is   the   method  
refiguration   uses   to   revise   and   innovate   the   (previously)   configured  world   of   the   text   and   the  
prefigured   world   of   action.   But   unlike   Husserl’s   phenomenological   questioning   back   which  
occurs   at   the   individual   level,   Ricœur’s   questioning   back   “applied   to   historiographical  
knowledge,   refers   to   a   cultural   world   that   is   already   structured   and   not   at   all   to   immediate  
[individual]  experience.”25  
As  discussed  above,  we  can   follow  a   story  because,   first,  we  assume   that   there  exists  a  
complete  teleological  understanding,  and,  second,  because  there  is  a  gap  in  our  knowledge  that  
drives   us   causally   toward   that   understanding.   For   example,   as   I   write   the   present   study,   the  
world   is   in   the   midst   of   a   search   for   missing   Malaysia  flight  370   and   the   reasons   for   its  
disappearance.   We   assume   that   there   exists   a   complete   understanding   of   the   actual   events  
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surrounding   this   disappearance,   and   our   lack   of   understanding   drives   us   toward   finding   it.  
Questioning  back,   for  Ricœur,   is  a  method  that   introduces  provisional  procedures,  entities,  and  
temporal  divisions  to  mediate  the  epistemological  break  between  historical  knowledge  and  “our  
ability   to   follow   a   story.”26   These   mediations   or   “relay   stations”   between   time   and   narrative  
become   known   as   quasi-­‐‑events,   quasi-­‐‑characters,   and   quasi-­‐‑plots,   respectively.   The   method  
maintains  the  individual  characteristics  of  the  (real)  singular  event,  plot,  and  concrete  agent  (with  
reference   to   the   three   levels   of   mimesis)   without   reducing   them   to   heterogeneous   events   or  
subjective   analyses   that   lose   explanatory  value.   This   is   the   “real”   sphere   of   characters,   actions,  
and  causal   relationships  between  events  which  he   calls   “first-­‐‑order   entities,”  and   the   sphere   to  
which   they  refer  he  calls  “participatory  belonging.”27  As  history  “questions  back”   toward   these  
actual   practices,   quasi-­‐‑plot   and   quasi-­‐‑characters   serve   as   “relay   stations”   en   route   toward  
participatory  belonging.  These  second-­‐‑order  entities  are  points  along  the  circular  path  connecting  
prefiguration,   configuration   and   refiguration.   Depending   on   the   reception   of   the   reader   who  
configures   the   entities,   they   can   be   more   or   less   singular   or   universal.   He   describes   singular  
causal   imputation   as   the   “explanatory   procedure   that   accomplishes   the   transition   between  
narrative   causality…   and   explanatory   causality,   that,   in   the   covering   law   model,   is   not  
distinguished   from   explanation   by   laws.”28   This   aspect   of   questioning   back   addresses   the  
epistemological  break  within  the  realm  of  the  procedures  of  history.  
Some   critics   have  pointed   to  weaknesses   in  Ricœur’s   overall   thesis   at   this   point.   I  will  
address  two  criticism  of  his  solution  of  questioning  back—one  which  views  it  as  a  failed  project  
of   reciprocity,   and   one   which   aligns   it   with   dangerous   elements   in   Heideggerian   theory.  
Semiological  and  linguistic  theories,  “reject  as  a  postulate  of  their  method  the  idea  of  an  intention  
oriented  toward  the  extralinguistic.”29  These  readers  find  evidence  in  Ricœur’s  questioning  back  
approach  for  a  model  of  reciprocity  between  the  text  and  context  that  does  not  prioritize  one  over  
the  other.  Paul  Connerty  writes:  
Ricœur’s  argument  that  the  structure  and  context  of  historical  narrative  are  in  a  reciprocal  
rather  than  a  hierarchical  relationship  allows  him  to  draw  a  very  important  conclusion—
that  there  exists  a  kind  of  speculative  discourse,  quasi-­‐‑narrative,  that  is  neither  fiction  nor  
theory.  And  yet  at  the  very  moment  when  he  makes  this  point,  he  finds  himself  forced  to  
reaffirm  the  hierarchical  nature  of  the  relationship  between  history  and  its  context.30  
Importantly,  Ricœur  accepts   an  ontological  distinction  between   the  pre-­‐‑figured  and  configured  
realms  in  arguing  that  “only  history  can  claim  a  reference  inscribed  in  empirical  reality,  inasmuch  
as  historical   intentionality   aims   at   events   that   have   actually   occurred.”31  Hence  Connerty   finds  
that   while   Ricœur   is   on   the   verge   of   developing   a   true   reciprocity   between   narrative   and  
ontological  history,  his  method,  “still  presumes  the  prior  existence  of  the  historical   ‘real,’  which  
distinguishes   this   ‘quasi-­‐‑narrative’   from   narrative   fiction.”32   Connerty   argues   that   Ricœur   is  
hesitant   to   support   his   own   theory   of   reciprocity   to   the   extent   that   Bakhtin’s   dialogism,   for  
example,   does.   Bakhtin   found   the   literary   text   both   a   representation   of   reality   and   an  
independent  rhetorical  structure  that  “has  ‘refracted’  (or  configured)  any  pre-­‐‑textual  real.”33  
In  response  to  this  criticism  of  the  structural  dimension  of  Ricœur’s  thesis  (the  reciprocity  
of   text   and   context),   I   believe   that   Connerty   overlooks   Ricœur’s   larger   project   stated   in   his  
preface—which   clearly   includes   upholding   the   truth   claim   of   the   narrative   work.   Indeed,   the  
Bakhtinian  dialogic  principle  (both  in  the  literary  text  and  as  a  phenomenological  principle)  of  co-­‐‑
experience   is   something   Ricœur   at   first   “rejoices”   to   find.34   But   Ricœur   ultimately   questions  
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whether  dialogism  does  not  deconstruct   itself  by  undermining  its  own  function  of  emplotment:  
“My  second  reaction  is  to  ask  if  the  dialogical  principle,  which  appears  to  crown  the  pyramid  of  
the  principles  of  composition  governing  narrative  fiction,  does  not  at   the  same  time  undermine  
the  base  of  the  edifice,  namely,  the  organizing  role  of  emplotment.”35  For  if  dialogism  substitutes  
itself   for   the   general   structural   principle   of   narrative,   it   is   prioritizing   its   own   form   over   the  
context  rather  than  maintaining  the  reciprocity  of  text  and  context.  
Hence  the  post-­‐‑structuralist  answer  to  the  question  of  which  is  ontologically  superior,  a  
narrative’s   context   or   its   text,   is   that   they   mutually   presuppose   each   other.   Connerty   finds  
Ricœur’s   reciprocity   project   unfulfilled   so   long   as   he   exercises   a   preference   for   context.   But  
reciprocity  itself  could  not  be  a  solution  for  Ricœur  insofar  as  it  renders  ahistorical  the  rhetorical  
structure   of   the   dialogue.   In   fact,   he   finds   it   impossible   to   apply   dialogism   to   historiography  
simply   by   virtue   of   the   fact   that   history   does   not   reciprocate   dialogue:   “The   encounter   with  
history  is  never  a  dialogue,  for  the  first  condition  of  dialogue  is  that  the  other  answer;  history  is  
this   sector   of   communication   without   reciprocity.”36   Insofar   as   context   is   aligned   with   the  
prefigured  realm  in  Ricœur’s  terminology,  and  text   is   the  configured  realm,  we  can  see  that  for  
Ricœur,   dialogue   occurs   largely  within   refiguration,   as   configured   narrative   is   often   locked   in  
place.   Dialogue   between   text   and   context   can   never   be   the   structural  methodology   of   history,  
then,  and  can  never  be  a  solution  to  problems  raised  by  the  linguistic  turn  in  historiography.  The  
reciprocity  Connerty  finds  in  Ricœur’s  work  (similar  to  forms  such  as  Bakhtin’s  dialogism  or  de  
Manian   undecideability)   focuses   on   upholding   the   epistemological   gap   between   the   prefigured  
and  configured  dimensions  of  narrative.  But  Ricœur  does  not  believe  that  historiography  seeks  to  
maintain   itself   as   a   gap   between   the   text   and   context.   On   the   contrary,   the   gap   functions  
historically  to  connect  us  to  by  driving  us  toward  understanding,  just  as  we  seek  to  understand  
reasons   for   the   disappeared   Malaysian   flight.   Ricœur   locates   the   dialogue   or   reciprocity   of  
questioning  back  as   the  responsibility  of   the  situated  reader  within   the  realm  of   refiguration   to  
shake   up   the   sedimented   texts   to   allow   the   prefigured   action   to   emerge.   Hence   the  
epistemological  gap  between  the  prefigured  and  configured  realms  is  not  a  formal  dialogism  to  
be   revered   in   itself;   instead,   this   non-­‐‑discursive,   pre-­‐‑narrative   world   of   action   seeks   to   be  
understood,  a  phenomenon  Ricœur  calls  “action  in  quest  of  narrative.”37  
Ricœur  explored  the  idea  of  historical  action  in  his  article  on  Hannah  Arendt  (published  
the  year  prior  to  Time  and  Narrative,  II).  Here,  he  calls  on  Arendt’s  description  of  action  to  support  
his  views.  Arendt  writes:  
Because   of   [the]   already   existing   web   of   human   relationships,   with   its   innumerable,  
conflicting  wills  and  intentions.  .   .  action  almost  never  achieves  its  purpose;  but  it  is  also  
because   of   this   medium,   in   which   action   alone   is   real,   that   [the   medium]   “produces”  
stories   with   or   without   intention   as   naturally   as   fabrication   produces   tangible   things.  
These  stories  may  then  be  recorded  in  documents  and  monuments,  they  may  be  visible  in  
use   objects   or   art   works,   they   may   be   told   and   retold   and   worked   into   all   kinds   of  
material.38  
As  Robert  Caserio  points   out,   the   autonomous  nature   of   action   ensures   that   it  will   exceed   our  
intellectual,  moral,  and  material  grasp  on  it,  while  “the  fabrication  process  is  what  we  can  get—
and  keep—a  hold  on,”  and  hence  not  only  does  narrative  fail  to  grasp  the  full  pre-­‐‑narrative  world  
of   action,   but   actions   themselves   “escape   even   their   most   responsible   intentions.”39   Arendt  
concludes  that  our  response  must  be  forgiveness,  “in  order  to  make  it  possible  for  life  to  go  on  by  
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constantly   releasing   men   from   what   they   have   done   unknowingly,”40   a   suggestion   akin   to  
Ricœur’s  call   for   trust   in   the  concordance  of   language   in  new  narrative   forms  which  will  “bear  
witness  to  the  fact  that  the  narrative  function  can  still  be  metamorphosed.  .  .  For  we  have  no  idea  
of  what  a   culture  would  be  where  no  one  any   longer  knew  what   it  meant   to  narrate   things.”41  
Danto’s  later  theory,  Caserio  points  out,  follows  along  these  lines  in  the  sense  that  actions  in  the  
present,   according   to   Danto,   have   an   unknown   future,   and   call   for   understanding   by   a   later  
narrative  action:  “The  knowledge  available  of   the  historian  is   logically  outside  the.   .   .  events  he  
describes.”42   Unlike   the   double   bind   logic   of   theories   of   reciprocity,   Danto,   like   Ricœur   and  
Arendt,   argues   that   a   world   of   action   does   exist   outside   the  world   of   narrative,   and   that   this  
world  of  action   is   in  quest  of  narration,  which  can  never  quite  grasp   it.  Perhaps,   then,  mystery  
and  paradox  are  the  perennial  subject  and  form  of  literature  not  just  because  they  self-­‐‑reflexively  
recognize   the   semiological   nature   of   action,   but   because   action   itself   is   infinite   and   therefore  
beyond  our  ability  to  manage  conceptually  or  textually.  
Because   action   is   in   quest   of   narrative   for   Ricœur,   his   reformulation   of   Husserlian  
questioning   back   traces   an   “indirect”   relationship   between   narrative   and   historical   events.  
Narrative  configuration,  he  says,  “emerges  out  of   the  break  that  sets  up  the  kingdom  of  the  plot  
and   splits   if   off   from   the   order   of   real   action.   On   the   other   hand,   it   refers   back   to   the  
understanding  immanent  in  the  order  of  action  and  to  the  prenarrative  structures  stemming  from  
real  action.”43  At  this  point,  the  claim  that  narrative  configuration  emerges  seemingly  without  an  
agent  brings  his  thesis  precariously  close  to  the  dangerous  water  of  Heideggerian  historicity,  and  
requires  a  further  clarification  of  his  thesis  on  the  role  of  prefiguration  in  questioning  back.  
In  his  1980  essay,  “Narrative  Time,”  Ricœur  examines  the  role  of  narrative  repetition  in  
fiction  and  history  and   its  mediating   role  between   the   contingencies  of   individual   fate   and   the  
abstractions  of  communal  destiny.  In  this  essay,  he  describes  prefiguration  as  a  primordial,  pre-­‐‑
linguistic  sense  of  history  that  exists  as  a  dream-­‐‑like  space  accessed  by  folk  tales.  We  have  a  sense  
of   going   “back”   to   this   history   through   these   oral   tales,   and   experience   a   preliminary  
disorientation   of   linear   time  when   experiencing   them.  Next,   configuration   appears,   as   legends  
and  chronicles  “recount”  tales  that  are  an  already-­‐‑established  part  of  a  heritage.  The  primordial  
constituting  of  history  thus  becomes  naively  passed  on  as  legends  and  chronicles.  Refiguration  in  
narrative  serves  as  the  act  of  repeating  legends  and  chronicles  into  writing  as  we  attempt  to  form  
and   understand   them   and   then   by   critically   rewrite   them   in   historiography.   It   is   in   this   final  
dimension,  Ricœur   says,   that  history  and  narrative  get   confused,   for   temporality   and  narrative  
get   rewritten   and   critically   analyzed.   It   is   important   to   note   that   for   Ricœur   this   history   of  
narrative   is  not  a   literal,  chronological  history,  but   is  an  analysis  of   time,  and  therefore  history,  
whereby   all   three  modes   of   time   coexist.   Like  memory,   narrative   repetition   retrieves   inherited  
potentialities   that   already   exist.   His   theory   of   time   and   narrative   thus   takes   its   cue   from  
Heidegger  in  arguing  that  “the  ordinary  representation  of  time  as  a  linear  series  of  ‘nows’  hides  
the   true   constitution   of   time,”44   but   his   metaphorical   division   is   an   inversion   of   Heidegger’s  
theory   of   time,   which   is   divided   into   three   levels.   First,   the   level   closest   to   the   ordinary  
representation  of  linear  time  Heidegger  calls  the  notion  of  “within-­‐‑time-­‐‑ness,”  the  notion  of  time  
as  a  structure  “in”  which  events  take  place.  It  is  datable,  public,  and  measurable,  and  depends  on  
point  of  reference  in  the  world.  Next,  time  is  seen  as  “historicality,”  a  term  which  emphasizes  the  
weight  of   the  past  and  the  “power  of  recovering  the   ‘extension’  between  birth  and  death  in  the  
work  of   ‘repetition’.”45  Heidegger’s  deepest   sense  of   time,   that  upon  which  his   entire   theory   is  
based,  is  the  notion  of  a  plural  unity  of  future,  past,  and  present,  rooted  in  the  notion  of  “care,”  
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particularly   as   the   concern   of   an   individual   reflecting   on   his   or   her   own   mortality.   Here,   an  
individual’s   being-­‐‑toward-­‐‑death   drives   all   other   levels   of   temporality.   For   Heidegger,   the  
impulse  toward  the  future  is  limited  by  the  individual’s  being-­‐‑toward-­‐‑death,  his  sense  of  his  own  
mortality.  Repetition  of  the  past  is  thus  limited  as  individual  fate,  the  character  of  being  “thrown  
into”  a  state  of  affairs.  What  Ricœur  and  other  theorists  find  troubling  about  Heidegger’s  theories  
is  the  sense  of  the  inevitability  of  historical  outcomes  that  they  entail.  Heidegger  writes,  “Fate  is  
that  powerless  superior  power  which  puts  itself  in  readiness  for  adversities.”46  
Ricœur   finds   Heidegger’s   analysis   of   time   useful,   but,   as   described   above,   essentially  
inverts  his  hierarchy  of  the  levels  of  time  by  revising  the  role  of  narrative  in  historical  questioning  
back.  First,  he  argues,  narrative  repetition  allows  the  reader  to  read  the  end  in  the  beginning  and  
the   beginning   in   the   end,   so   that   the   “plot”   establishes   human   action   “in”   time,   and   also   in  
memory:  the  course  of  events  stretches  along  time  between  a  beginning  and  an  end,  and  we  are  
able   to   read   that   course   backwards   and   forwards.   But   repetition   has   another   level   of  
interpretation  for  Ricœur:  
It  means  the  “retrieval”  of  our  most  fundamental  potentialities,  as  they  are  inherited  from  
our  own  past,  in  terms  of  a  personal  fate  and  a  common  destiny.  The  question,  therefore,  
is   whether   we   may   go   so   far   as   to   say   that   the   function   of   narrative—or   at   least   of   a  
selected   group   of   narratives—is   to   establish   human   action   at   the   level   of   authentic  
historicality,  that  is,  of  repetition.47  
The   problem   with   Heidegger’s   notion   of   destiny   is   that   it   has   the   potential   to   use   narrative  
repetition   to   bind   people   to   a   potentially   misleading   idea.   Heidegger   starts   with   the   idea   of  
individual   fate,   a   personal,   incommunicable   awareness   of   one’s   own   mortality,   and   he  
subsequently  imposes  a  sense  of  communal  time  on  this  fate  through  narrative.  Hence  a  result  of  
Heidegger’s  philosophy  is  that  individual,  misleading  worldviews  have  the  power  to  be  repeated  
as  communal  destiny.  But  Ricœur  argues  that  narrative  is  communal  from  the  outset  in  its  sense  of  
time.  As  a   social   transaction,  narrative  has   this  public,   communal  dimension  built   into   its  very  
structure:  “After  all,   is  not  narrative   time  a   time   that  continues  beyond   the  death  of  each  of   its  
protagonists?  Is  it  not  part  of  the  plot  to  include  the  death  of  each  hero  in  a  story  that  surpasses  
every  individual  fate?,”48  a  question  echoed  by  J.  Hillis  Miller  in  Ariadne’s  Thread:  “All  narrative  is  
a   species  of  epitaph,  a  memoir  or  memorial,  an  oblique  act  of  mourning.  Someone   is  dead  and  
someone  has  survived  that  death  to  mourn  and  to  narrate  the  dead  person’s  story.”49  Narrative  
repetition  is  thus  a  communal  act:  
It  is  always  a  community,  a  people,  or  a  group  of  protagonists  which  tries  to  take  up  the  
tradition—or  traditions—of  its  origins.  
It  is  this  communal  act  of  repetition,  which  is  at  the  same  time  a  new  founding  act  and  a  
recommencement   of   what   has   already   been   inaugurated,   that   ‘makes   history’   and   that  
finally   makes   it   possible   to   write   history…   Repetition…   is   always   articulated   in   a  
narrative  mode.50  
Narrative   is  a  process  whereby  a  non-­‐‑discursive  primordial  history  has  been  emplotted  
and  is  repeatedly  re-­‐‑enacted  and  analyzed  by  a  community  of  people.  According  to  Ricœur,  then,  
individual  self-­‐‑consciousness,  whether  Dasein,  or  a  Husserlian  isolated  ego,  cannot  be  the  starting  
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point  for  inquiry  into  the  philosophy  of  history,  since  any  inquiry  will  begin  as  a  refiguration  by  a  
situated  reader  or  community.  
Having   put   to   rest   concerns   that   questioning   back,   with   its   (already)   configured  
dimension,  might  be  conflated  with  Heideggerian  destiny,  as  well  as  concerns   that  questioning  
back  is  a  failed  attempt  at  reciprocity,  we  can  now  return  to  Ricœur’s  analysis  of  the  relationship  
between  historical  time  and  narrative.  Ricœur  writes  that,  on  one  hand,  narrative  is  distinct  from  
the  world  of  action  and  must  be  drawn  forward  through  plot,  but  on  the  other  hand,  narrative  
requires  prior  understanding  “immanent  in  the  order  of  [prenarrative]  action.”51  Precisely  how  an  
already-­‐‑communally-­‐‑configured   plot   is   refigured,   however,   is   the   primary   problem   raised   by  
considering   the   interaction   among   refiguration,   configuration,   prefiguration.   Ricœur’s   struggle  
with   the  mediation   between   history   and   narrative   parallels,   in   a   sense,   von  Wright’s   struggle  
with   the   logical   schema   underlying   understanding   and   explanation.   It   is   at   this   point   that  we  
may   examine   von   Wright’s   work   on   the   distinction   between   explanation   and   understanding.  
Ricœur  acknowledges  that  he  owes  a  debt  to  analytic  philosophy  for  providing  “some  sureness  
and  rigor”  to  his  own  reconstructive  method.52  
The  “Complex”  Explanatory  Thesis  of  von  Wright  
While   Ricœur   was   examining   the   method   by   which   an   already-­‐‑configured   world   of  
action  becomes  reconfigured  from  a  hermeneutic  perspective,  von  Wright  was  grappling  with  a  
similar  dilemma  from  a  logical  perspective.  He  devoted  his  career  to  an  exploration  of  a  new  type  
of   logic—the   logic   of   obligation,   or   “deontic”   logic.   Consider   the   following   deontic   sentence  
which   concerns   a   statement   about   an   obligation:   “You  may   not   park   your   car   this   side   of   the  
street.”  Such  a  sentence,  of  course,  may  be  read  prescriptively  or  descriptively.  In  the  prescriptive  
sense,  the  sentence  cannot  be  said  to  be  true  or  false:  von  Wright  refers  to  this  a  “norm.”  In  the  
descriptive   sense,   the   sentence   can   be   said   to   be   true   or   false,   and   is   referred   to   as   a   norm-­‐‑
proposition.  Since  the  norms  themselves  cannot  be  true  or  false,  how  are  statements  about  them  
to  convey  meaning?  At  first,  von  Wright  argued  that  they  are  verifiable  if  they  are  consistent  and  
doable  (achievable  through  human  action).  But,  without  designations  of  true  and  false,  how  are  
they  to  be  considered  consistent  or   inconsistent  on  this  ground?  “One  cannot  answer  by  saying  
that   they   cannot   both   be   true,   since   truth-­‐‑value   does   not   apply   to   them.   The   only   acceptable  
answer  I  can  think  of  must  make  reference  to  the  purpose  or  rationale  of  norm-­‐‑giving  activity.”53  
But  rationality,   in   traditional   logic,   is  defined   in   terms  of  consistency  and  entailment.  Hence  he  
was  forced  to  become  a  “lone  wolf”  in  his  field54  and  to  suggest  an  expanded  view  of  logic  itself.  
While  the  logic  of  propositions  rely  on  consistency  and  entailment,  the  logic  of  norms  relies  more  
fundamentally  on   their  doability   and   their   rationality,   concepts  which  he   says  “have  no  place   in  
pure,  traditional  logic.”55  He  concludes:  
One  could  on  this  ground  say  that  norms,  after  all,  have  no  logic,  that  deontic  logic  is  an  
impossibility.  But  since  the  definitions  given  make  the  logical  notions  of  consistency  and  
entailment  applicable  to  genuine  norms  in  what  seems  a  very  natural  and  convincing  way  [my  
emphasis],   one   could   also   say   that   this   shows   that   logic,   in   fact,  has   a  wider   reach   than  
truth.  I  leave  it  to  the  reader  to  decide  which  attitude  is  wiser.56  
In  his  work  on  deontic  logic,  he  found  that  the  laws  of  propositional  logic  were  not  sufficient  to  
account  for  the  reasons  underlying  human  action.  What  makes  these  norms  seem  consistent  and  
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coherent,   then?   In   this   passage,   I   believe   that   his   appeal   to   reasons   which   are   “natural   and  
convincing”  parallels  his  work  on  “understanding  explanation,”  and,  while  he  never  describes  it  
as  such,  he  essentially  calls  for  a  narrative  definition  of  rationality.  I  will  return  to  this  notion  of  
von  Wright’s  underlying  narrative   thesis,  but   first  we  must  explore  his  difficult  and  sometimes  
painful  search  to  articulate  the  relationship  between  human  actions  and  their  causes  and  reasons.  
Von  Wright   continued   to   expand  his   research   on   the   nature   of   the   connection   or   “tie”  
between   norms   and   normative   propositions   to   the   realm   of   the   “tie”   connecting   reasons   and  
actions   in   historical   explanation.   In   Explanation   and   Understanding   (1971),   von   Wright   was  
concerned   with   historical   “explanation,”   and,   like   Ricœur,   he   found   that   simple   models   of  
explanation   were   insufficient.   Simple   causal   explanations,   particularly   Hempel’s   subsumption  
theory,  may  account  for  behavior,  he  thought,  but  they  do  not  account  for  human  action,  which  
necessarily   involves   intention.   A   causal   explanation   of   a   behavior   might   justify   the   action   in  
terms  of  behavior  (the  light  was  turned  on  because  my  arm  reached  up  and  turned  it  on),  but  not  
in  terms  of  intention  (did  I  intend  to  turn  on  the  light,  or  was  I  perhaps  sleepwalking?).  In  causal  
theory,   the   reason   is   necessarily   independent   of   the   action.   But   von  Wright   believed   that   the  
reasons   are   mutually   dependent   on   the   actions.   Consider   the   following   schema,   or   set   of  
propositions,  called  the  practical  inference:  
A  intends  to  bring  about  p.  
A  considers  that  he  cannot  bring  about  p  unless  he  does  a.  
Therefore  A  sets  himself  to  do  a.57  
The   first   two   premises   describe   the   person’s   intentions.   The   conclusion   describes   the   action  
performed.   If   the   intentions   can   be   empirically   verified,   and   the   conclusion   can   also   be  
independently   verified,   have   we   then   determined   that   the   tie   between   them   (the   causal  
relationship)  is  also  empirically  verifiable?  If  so,  then  the  reasons  and  the  actions  are  independent  
and  Hempel’s  causal  theory  of  explanation  holds  firm.  But,  as  we  shall  see,  von  Wright  believed  
that  the  three  propositions  are  not   independent,  but  are   instead  mutually  dependent.  We  could  
write   the   practical   syllogism   in   one   of   two   forms—an   “if.   .   .   then”   statement   or   a   “because”  
statement:  “If  A  intends  to  bring  about  p,  and  A  considers  that  he  cannot  bring  about  p  unless  he  
does  a,  then  A  sets  himself  to  do  a,”  or,  “Because  A  intends  to  bring  about  p  and  considers  that  he  
cannot  bring  about  p  unless  he  does  a,  A  sets  himself  to  do  a.”  Both  of  these  forms  articulate  the  
“tie”  between  the  premises  and  conclusion—the  intention  and  the  action—that  is  implied  in  the  
syllogistic   form.   Von   Wright   questioned   the   nature   of   this   implied   connection   between   the  
intention  and   the  action  and  assumed   that   it   took  one  of   two   forms:   either   the   connection  was  
causal  and  empirical  (which  he  defines  as  being  subsumable  under  general  laws)58  or  the  tie  was  
one   of   logical   entailment.   Each   action   in   the   premise   and   conclusion   seems   to   be   empirically  
verifiable.  But  does   that  require   that   the  connection  between  the  premises  and  conclusion   is  also  
empirical?59   His   answer   is   that   there   is   a   logical,   rather   than   empirical,   connection   between  
premises  and  conclusion  (the  Logical  Connection  Argument).  
The  verification  of   the  premises   of   a  practical   argument   again  presupposes   that  we   can  
single   out   some   recorded   item   of   behavior   as   being   intentional   under   the   description  
accorded  to  it  either  by  those  premises  themselves  (“immediate”  verification)  or  by  some  
other   set   of   premises   which   entail   those   of   the   argument   under   discussion   (“external”  
verification).  
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In   this   mutual   dependence   of   the   verification   of   premises   and   the   verification   of  
conclusions  in  practical  syllogisms  consists,  as  I  see  it,  the  truth  of  the  Logical  Connection  
Argument.60  
How  do  we  verify  someone’s  intentional  behavior?  Only  by  reference  to  whether  the  behavior  is  
actually  completed.  This  crucial  insight  into  the  circular  or  mutually  dependent  nature  of  causal  
explanation   in   history   opened   him   up   to   criticism   and   led   to   a   lifetime   of   adjustments   and  
attempts  to  articulate  and  re-­‐‑articulate  the  relationship  he  sensed  between  reasons  and  actions.  
The   first   version   of   the   mutual   dependence   relationship   was   the   “logical   entailment  
solution.”  From  a  logical  perspective,  he  appears  to  argue  for  the  analytic  mutual  presupposition  
of  the  verification  of  the  premises  and  conclusion:  verifying  the   intention  of  a  behavior  (the  first  
premise)   can   only   be   accomplished   by   singling   out   a   “recorded   item   of   behavior”—and   this  
means  ultimately  referring  to  the  premise  itself.  Thus,  the  argument  appears  to  be  analytic  (and  
thus   not   falsifiable/empirical/causal)   or   even   tautological,   despite   the   empirical   nature   of   the  
premises.  
While  von  Wright  in  the  above  passage  accepts  the  possibility  of  external  verification  of  
the  premises,  Rex  Martin  points  out  that  basing  the  verifiability  of  the  premises  on  any  “recorded  
items  of  behavior”  other  than  the  actual  action  performed  could  mean  that  “we  would  have  the  
possibility   of   verifying   von  Wright’s   intention  without   respect   to  whether   he   actually   does   or  
does  not  do  A.”61  Using  von  Wright’s  example,  if  he  intended  to  go  to  Copenhagen,  he  will  buy  a  
ticket  before  departure   time;  he  will  not   fly   to  Beijing   two  hours  before  departure.  But,  Martin  
notes,   any   other   recorded   behavior   besides   his   actually   going   to   Copenhagen   (the   conclusion)  
would  not  in  fact  verify  the  truth  of  his  intention.  “If  this  is  so,”  Martin  states,  “the  verifiability  
argument  does  not  support  the  logical  entailment  thesis”  after  all.62  Hence,  while  arguing  for  the  
structural   truth   of   the   Logical   Connection   Argument,   von  Wright   is   also   arguing   against   the  
ontological  necessity  of  entailment:  
Thus,  despite   the   truth  of   the  Logical  Connection  Argument,   the  premises  of  a  practical  
inference  do  not  with  logical  necessity  entail  behavior.  They  do  not  entail  the  “existence”  
of  a  conclusion  to  match  them.  The  syllogism  when  leading  up  to  action  is  “practical”  and  
not  a  piece  of   logical  demonstration.   It   is  only  when  action   is   already   there   and  a  practical  
argument   is   constructed   to   explain   or   justify   it   that   we   have   a   logically   conclusive  
argument.63  
Martin   argues   that   Von   Wright   himself   abandons   the   logical   entailment   (or   analytic)  
solution   in   1976:   “[I]   think   it   a   mistake—of   which   I   myself   and   others   have   been   guilty—to  
understand  the  intentionalist  view  to  mean  that  there  is  a  relation  of  logical  entailment  between  
the  premises  and  the  conclusion  of  a  practical  argument.”64  Yet  he  recognized  the  “truth”  of  the  
argument   itself   and   was   not   prepared   to   abandon   hope   for   a   nomological   approach   to   the  
problem.  
Throughout  Explanation  and  Understanding,  he  upholds  faith  in  the  structural  truth  of  the  
logical   connection   between   premises   and   conclusion,   even  while   refusing   to   accept   a   covering  
law  model   to   explain   this   formal   schema.  He   attempts   a   second   explanatory  model—a   hybrid  
solution  that   is   teleological  rather   than  analytic  at   the  formal   level  of   the  schema,  but  empirical  
within   the   parameters   of   the   individual   events   and   agents.   Von   Wright   notes   that   historical  
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understanding  could  ultimately  be  achieved  only  by  the  state  of  full  description—an  ideal  state  of  
full  understanding  similar  to  a  Tractatus-­‐‑world  envisioned  by  Wittgenstein.65  But  if  we  cordon  off  
a  segment  of  this  full  understanding  community  and  examine  any  particular  state  system  within  
it,  we  find  that  in  any  state  system,  the  intention  of  the  agent  and  the  act  performed  make  up  two  
known   facts.  And  within   this  mediating   or   hybrid   system,   causal   rules   do   apply.  He   uses   the  
example  of  the  shots  fired  at  Sarajevo  as  a  “cause”  of  the  war,  so  long  as  we  are  remaining  in  the  
closed  state  system  we  have  isolated  to  study.  
And  to  call  the  explanation  “causal”  is  also  quite  in  order  so  long  as  we  do  not  assimilate  
it  to  explanations  which  fit  the  covering  law  model.  To  call  the  explanation  “teleological”  
would   certainly   be   a  misnomer,   although   teleology   essentially   enters   into   the   practical  
inferences  which  link  the  explanans  to  the  explanandum.  When,  faute  de  mieux,  I  call  it  quasi-­‐‑
causal   this  does  not   imply  any  value   judgment  or   imperfection  of   it  as  an  explanation.   I  
use   the   term   because   the   explanation   does   not   depend   for   its   validity   on   the   truth   of  
general  laws.66  
This  hybrid  solution  is  important  for  Ricœur’s  development  of  the  mediating  or  “quasi”  
character   of   events   in   his   theory   of   questioning   back.   For   Ricœur,   von   Wright’s   quasi-­‐‑causal  
explanation  was  valuable  in  historical  explanation  for  allowing  us  to  include  the  conviction  of  the  
agent  in  causation.  The  “tie”  between  the  intention  and  the  action  for  von  Wright  begins  with  the  
“doability”  of  the  act—the  agent  must  assume  that  he  can  accomplish  the  action.67  The  decision  to  
do  something  (the  basic  action  itself,  rather  than  the  bringing  about  of  something  else),  generates  
the  closure  of  the  system  and  sets  in  motion  the  causal  relationships  of  that  system.  In  Ricœurian  
terminology,  we  might   say   that,   emerging   from   the   prefigured  world   of   action,   the   agent   acts  
(does   something   or   questions   back),   and   in   the   process   of   acting,   a   world   is   closed   off   or  
configured.   Within   the   sphere   in   which   the   agent   now   finds   himself,   causal,   explanatory  
relationships  apply.  
The  hybrid   solution  allows   for   covering   laws   to  apply   in  a   state   system,  but  not   to   the  
world  of  full  understanding.  In  Norm  and  Action,  von  Wright  had  also  relinquished  norms  (which,  
as   we   recall,   have   no   truth   value)   to   a   hybrid   position   in   logic.   However,   as   a   logician,   von  
Wright  was  dissatisfied  with  his  hybrid  solution  to  the  point  of  torment.  
Now   the   question   arose:  Was  deontic   logic,   after   all,   not   a   logic   of   norms  but   of   norm-­‐‑
propositions?  In  Norm  and  Action   I  opted  for   the  second  alternative—on  the  ground  that  
the   application   of   sentential   connectives   to   prescriptively   interpreted   deontic   sentences  
seemed  problematic.  But  at  the  same  time  I  also  thought  that  the  axioms  and  theorems  of  
deontic   logic   reflected   genuine   logical   properties   of   the   norms   themselves.   I   thus  
attributed  to  deontic  logic,  as  it  then  existed,  a  kind  of  “hybrid”  status  in  relation  to  norms  
and  norm-­‐‑propositions.  This,  obviously,  was  not  a  very  satisfactory  position.  No  wonder,  
therefore,   that   the   problem   to   which   it   had   suggested   a   solution   continued   to   torment  
me.68  
Again,  we  might  ask,  how  do  the  reasons  and  actions  relate  to  one  another  if  not  through  covering  
laws?   Is   it   possible   for   nomological   rules   to   apply   in   this   hybrid   fashion   only  within   a   norm-­‐‑
proposition   or   a   causal   state   system?   The   question   that   kept   plaguing   him   was   the   deeper  
relationship  of  the  “tie”  or  connection  between  these  elements.  
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Searching   for   the   ground   of   these   connections,   he   turned   to   higher   logical   principles  
themselves—logical   consistency   (the   obligation   of   a   contradiction-­‐‑free   system)   and   coherence  
(the   normative   obligation   of   a   gapless   system).69   According   to   von  Wright   in   Explanation   and  
Understanding,   if   we   receive   consistent   and   comprehensive   descriptions   for   the   connection  
between  one  state  and  another,  then  we  have  explained  the  action,  and  within  the  closed  system,  
causal  rules  apply.  
But,   as   Rex   Martin   points   out,   the   logical   consistency   of   descriptions   alone   is   not  
sufficient  for  causal  explanation.  For  example,  if  we  attempt  to  understand  the  cause  of  one  event  
by  consistently  inserting  the  same  facts  in  the  practical  inference  syllogism,  above,  then  we  could  
obtain   a   case   such  as   the  one  Martin  describes:   an  American   journalist   in  China   asks   a   factory  
owner  how  Mao’s  ideas  could  have  increased  production  in  his  factory.  Rather  than  receiving  an  
answer  as  to  how  or  why  the  ideas  related  to  his  output,  he  is  instead  repeatedly  shown  examples  
of  efficient  production.  70  
Martin   points   out   that   missing   from   these   types   of   answers,   however   consistently  
described,  is  the  notion  of  intelligibility  in  the  connection  between  the  question  and  the  answer.71  
The  Convergence  of  Ricœur’s  and  von  Wright’s  Theses:  Intelligibility  as  
Narrative  Understanding  
In   von  Wright’s   1999   retrospective   view  of   his  work   on  deontic   logic,   he   reviewed  his  
appeal  to  consistency  and  asked  what  could  ultimately  be  the  justification  for  the  appeal  to  this  
higher   order   principle   of   consistency.   “The   only   acceptable   answer”   he   can   supply   is   that   of  
rationality  itself,  for  “it  would  be  irrational,  contrary  to  reason,  if  a  law-­‐‑giver  enjoined  or  allowed  
things  which  cannot  be  done.”72  Martin  notes   that  von  Wright  recognized   the   limitations  of  his  
thesis  on  understanding  as  expressed  as  a  “hybrid”  theory,  even  with  an  emphasis  on  the  higher  
principle  of  consistency,  and  that  his  definition  of  understanding  evolved  in  his  later  writings  to  
reflect   this   limitation   and   thereby   account   for   rationality   in   terms   of   intelligibility.   In   his   1984  
lecture,   “Of   Human   Freedom,”   von   Wright,   as   Martin   points   out,   first   uses   the   term  
“understanding   explanation”   to   account   for   the   intelligible   dimension   of   explanation   not  
considered   in   his   previous   theory   of   understanding.73   The   concept   of   “understanding  
explanation”   included  two  parts—(1)   the   formal  schema  I  have  been  describing   in   the  practical  
inference   syllogism,   above,74   and   (2)   the   notion   of   intelligibility   captured   in   the   idea   of  
understanding.  An  “understanding  explanation”  is  an  explanation  given  in  terms  of  reasons,  and  
reasons,  in  turn,  must  “be  sieved  through  the  medium  of  the  understanding”  in  order  to  become  
a  reason  for  the  agent.75  Understanding  as  intelligibility  seems  to  be  self-­‐‑justifying.  Consistency  is  
certainly   not   sufficient   to   justify   intelligibility,   as   we   have   shown,   so   von   Wright   ultimately  
appeals  to  the  notion  of  self-­‐‑coherence  of  the  system,  the  mutual  dependency  of  the  premises  and  
conclusion   in   an   intelligible  manner.   I   have   argued   that   he   ultimately   finds   that   reasons  must  
apply   “in   what   seems   a   very   natural   and   convincing   way,”   in   essence   arguing   that   reason  
requires  narrative  intelligibility.  
While   von   Wright   does   not   refer   directly   to   narrative,   I   believe   that   his   thesis   on  
intelligibility,   which   is   the   ground   for   his   thesis   on   understanding   explanation,   relies   on   a  
definition  of  intelligibility  as  narrativity  in  Ricœur’s  more  complex  sense.  Ricœur  recognized  the  
parallel   in  Time  and  Narrative,   I,  but   I  am  not  aware  that  von  Wright  nor  any  his  commentators  
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have  explored  this  thread  in  von  Wright’s  own  theory.  First,  we  may  consider  how  von  Wright  
himself   describes   and   justifies   rationality.   In   Explanation   and   Understanding,   he   proposes   the  
“shocking”   answer   that   efficacious   reasons   (those   which   contribute   to   an   explanation   of   an  
action)  “are   those   in   light  of  which  we  explain  the  action.   .   .   the  truth  of   the  action  explanation  
has   no   basis   in   facts   other   than   the   understanding   itself   of   the   action   in   the   context   of   its  
reasons.”76  Here,  to  review,  he  is  making  a  case  for  the  mutual  dependency  of  the  premises  and  
conclusion,  an  ostensibly  tautological  argument.  The  agent  could  thereby   justify  his  or  her  own  
intentions,   but   how   does   one   justify   the   “tie”   between   reasons   and   actions   from   an   outside  
perspective?  When  two  people  disagree,  we  must  appeal  to  rational  argument:  
The  rational  arguments  which  the  outsider  could  use  would.   .   .   for  example,   try  to  make  
the   agent   see   his   present   action   in   the   setting   of   a   larger   fragment   of   his   life-­‐‑history   [my  
emphasis].  He  would  point  to  incidents  in  the  agent’s  past  which  are  “public  knowledge”  
and  which   the   agent  would  not  deny.  He  would   also  hold  up   for  him   the   image  of  his  
character  which  others  have  formed  and  ask  the  agent  to  ponder  the  facts  which  led  to  the  
formation  of   this   image  and   to  compare   it  with  his  self-­‐‑image.  He  may  warn  him  of  his  
own  future  actions,  ask  him  to  watch  himself  better.77  
We   might   note   that   in   this   passage,   von  Wright’s   first   example   of   a   rational   appeal   is   to   the  
action’s   place  within   a   larger   setting   of   the   agent’s   “life-­‐‑history,”   suggesting   the   primacy   of   a  
narrative  dimension   in  understanding.  This   life-­‐‑community  can  be  further  defined  by  reference  
to  the  action’s  characteristics  of  coherence  within  a  life-­‐‑community,  of  temporal  continuity  and  of  
consistency.  The  premises   therefore  seem  to   imply  the  conclusion   in  a   teleological  manner,  and  
the   action   is   thus   understood   only   within   a   “life-­‐‑community”   in   the   same   way,   von   Wright  
argues,  that  we  consider  language  to  be  invested  with  meaning  only  within  a  linguistic  system.78    
The  justification  for  von  Wright’s  Logical  Connection  Argument  would  seem  to  depend,  
then,   on   narrative   intelligibility,   which   views   actions   both   as   a   public   context   and   from   a  
particular   perspective,   echoing   Ricœur’s   description   of   narrative:   “It   is   this   communal   act   of  
repetition,  which   is   at   the   same   time   a   new   founding   act   and   a   recommencement   of  what   has  
already   been   inaugurated,   that   ‘makes   history’.   .   .   Repetition.   .   .   is   always   articulated   in   a  
narrative  mode.”  79  Refiguration  is  the  act  of  repeating  what  is  already  (publicly)  known,  and  asks  
the   reader   to   shake   sedimented   layers,   as  von  Wright   is   asking  us   to  establish   intelligibility  by  
holding  up  images  of  one’s  character,  pondering  and  comparing  these  images  to  one’s  self-­‐‑image.  
Repetition  (or  consistency)  in  logic  was  not  enough  to  establish  intelligibility,  and  repetition  (as  a  
consistently  repeated  story)  is  likewise  insufficient  to  understand  history,  or  else  a  false  ideology  
could  become  established  as  destiny  in  a  Heideggerian  sense.  Instead,  as  von  Wright  and  Ricœur  
make  clear,  one’s  life-­‐‑community  must  take  on  this  task  of  repetition  together  with  the  self-­‐‑aware  
agent  in  order  to  arrive  at  an  intelligible  explanation  that  exceeds  a  merely  consistent  one.  
Von  Wright’s  commentators  unintentionally  bring   the  narrative  dimension  of  his   thesis  
of   “understanding   explanation”   to   light   even   further.   Martin   describes   von   Wright’s  
“understanding  explanation”  thesis  as  his  “most  considerable  and.  .  .  durable  contribution  to  the  
philosophy  of  history”   for   its   combination  of   the  nomological   schema  of   the  practical   inference  
with   the   notion   of   intelligible   connections   among   each   element   of   the   schema.   But   note   in   the  
following   passage   the   language   Martin   uses   to   describe   von   Wright’s   intelligibility   which,  
perhaps  unintentionally,  assumes  this  narrative  dimension:  
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I   think   a   distinction   between   explanation   and   understanding   begins   to   emerge.   The  
explanation  so  achieved  [that  of  the  fully  described  state  world]  is  a  minimal  one;  it  is  an  
explanation   of   sorts   but   it   fails   to   satisfy   the   standard   of   understanding.   This   standard  
does  not  rule  out  the  explanation  as  an  explanation;  it  does  however,  indicate  a  deficiency  
in   an   important   respect.   For   an   action-­‐‑explanation   should   tell   us   something  more   than  
that   the   facts   cited   satisfy   the   standard   schema.   An   explanation   should   yield  
understanding:  it  should  provide  a  factual  narrative  that  we  can  follow  [my  emphasis].80  
Martin   here   seems   to   be   equating   “yield[ing]   understanding”   with   “provid[ing]   a   factual  
narrative   that  we   can   follow.”  Later   in  his   article,  he   argues   that   “if   it   is   true.   .   .   that   a  merely  
causal   account   of   narrative   understanding   (of   intelligible   connection)   cannot   be   given,   then   it  
follows   that   all   proper   action   explanations   are   indelibly   noncausal.”81   Here,   narrative  
understanding   is   again   equated  with   intelligible   connection   and   echoes  Ricoeur’s   thesis   on   the  
epistemic  dimension  of  narrativity:  “Time  becomes  human  time  to  the  extent  that  it  is  organized  
after  the  manner  of  a  narrative.”82  I  believe  that  these  passages  support  an  interpretation  of  von  
Wright’s  own  complex  thesis  in  Explanation  and  Understanding  that  the  mutual  dependency  of  the  
premises  and  conclusion  in  historical  explanation  are  narrative  in  nature.  
Conclusion  
Von  Wright’s  analytical  evaluation  of  explanation  and  understanding  thus  parallels  and  
points  to   limitations  of  Ricœur’s  evaluation  of   time  and  narrative   in  several   important  respects.  
First,  like  Ricœur,  von  Wright  rejected  the  simple  covering  law  thesis  of  historical  explanation  but  
was  concerned  with  the  reciprocal  or  circular  nature  of  the  relationship  between  general  schema  
and   singular   events.   Von  Wright   approached   the   problem   as   a   question   of   the   nature   of   the  
relationship   between   singular   events   and   found   that   neither   causal  models   (which   he   equated  
with   covering   law   model)   nor   logical   entailment   models   sufficiently   accounted   for   the  
relationship   between   intentions   and   actions.   Ricœur   approached   the   problem   of   the  
epistemological   gap   between   historical   context   (the  world   of   action)   and   historical   text   from   a  
narrative   perspective   but   found   that   current   (simple)   narrative   models   did   not   sufficiently  
account   for   this   schism.  Second,  both  proposed  a  provisional  or  hybrid  answer   located  between  
covering   law   and   singular,   unique   event.   Von   Wright   envisioned   a   potential   world   of   full  
understanding   that   extended   beyond   the   scope   of   causal   explanation,   but   nonetheless   allowed  
the   introduction   of   human   action   to   isolate   provisional   state-­‐‑systems   in  which   causal   rules   do  
apply.  In  this  way,  he  hoped  to  explain  the  means  by  which  logical  rules  could  connect  empirical  
events.   Ricœur’s   narrative   theory   was   influenced   by   this   hybrid   solution,   and   he   introduced  
concepts   of   quasi-­‐‑characters,   actions,   and   causal   relationships   that   serve   as   “relay   stations”   en  
route  to  full  historical  understanding,  or  “participatory  belonging.”  Through  this  hybrid  solution,  
both   von  Wright   and  Ricœur   could   argue   for   the  mutual   presupposition   of   abstract   form   and  
unique   context   in   historical   narrative   and   its   involvement   of   the   reader/historian   in   a   new  
discourse   between   fiction   and   theory.   Ricœur   describes   this   in   temporal   terms   as   a   “healthy  
circularity”83  and  in  narrative  terms  as  a  “living  dialectic.”84  
But  von  Wright  was  not  content  with  the  hybrid  solution  that  Ricœur  would  adopt—for  
he  did  not  accept  that  causal  relationships  could  hold  in  particular  instances  but  not  full  systems.  
He   thus   explored   the   notion   of   higher   order   conditions   of   rationality—consistency   and  
coherence.  Third,   consistency  or  repetition,  an   important  part  of  Ricœur’s   theory  of  questioning  
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back  was  logically  untenable  for  von  Wright,  as  it  did  not  account  for  the  reason  why  an  intention  
entailed   an   action.   For   Ricœur,   the   prefigured   (and   ontologically   superior)   realm   of   action  
remains   in   quest   of   narrative   in   concert  with   the   agents   articulating   and   configuring   the   texts.  
This   claim   has   the   potential   to   open   Ricœur’s   thesis   to   the   possibility   that   a   misleading   idea  
(patriarchy   or   white   supremacy,   for   example)   could   be   repeated   as   the   destiny   of   the   people  
repeating  it.  
Fourth,   to   avoid   the   problems   inherent   with   repetition,   both   Ricœur   and   von   Wright  
employ  a   systems  approach   to   the  problem  of   repetition  or   consistency.  Von  Wright’s   solution  
was   ultimately   a   non-­‐‑causal,   dual   model   he   termed   “understanding   explanation,”   which  
consisted   of   a   formal   schema   and   a   criterion   of   intelligibility   defined   in   terms   of   coherence.  
Coherence,  as  von  Wright  defined   it,  was  a  higher  order  condition  of  rationality,  but,  as   I  have  
pointed  out  that,  in  the  absence  of  merely  repetitive  consistency,  it  can  be  interpreted  in  terms  of  
narrative  intelligibility.  The  hermeneutic  and  analytic  models  of  explanation  and  understanding  
thus  converge  in  the  notion  of  understanding  as  narrative   intelligibility.  As  we  seek  answers  to  
the  reasons  why  Malaysian  flight  370  disappeared,  then,  we  might  consider  the  shortcomings  of  
some   of   the   alternative   models   of   explanation:   merely   repeating   a   story   does   not   make   the  
reasons   for   its   disappearance   intelligible;   our   goal   is   clearly   not   to   treat   competing   texts   as  
equally   valid,   nor   is   it   to  maintain   the   epistemic   gap   by   failing   to   fully   understand   the   event;  
probabilistic   theories  may  be  useful,  but  ultimately  do  not   lead   to  understanding   (especially   to  
the  people  whose  family  members  have  been  lost).  Rather,  the  actions  do  indeed  seem  to  move  in  
quest   of   narrative,   driving   us   as   a   world   community   to   understand   the   events   based   on   the  
intelligibility  of  the  emerging  story.  
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